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BRIDGING THE ENFORCEMENT GAP?
EVALUATING THE INQUIRY
PROCEDURE OF THE CEDAW
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
DR. CATHERINE O’ROURKE*
Considerable optimism accompanied the adoption of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) Optional Protocol. However, one of the Optional Protocol’s
two enforcement measures, the inquiry procedure, appeared to languish
for fourteen years and has, to date, resulted in only four inquiry reports.
The article evaluates the inquiry procedure, finding largely unmet
expectations in addressing CEDAW’s structural weaknesses, countering
the privileging of civil and political rights, and redressing state noncompliance with CEDAW, but significant potential nonetheless. The
findings of this Article vindicate the enduring salience of foundational
feminist critiques of human rights. The Conclusion proposes measures
to enhance the inquiry procedure’s efficacy.
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INTRODUCTION
The adoption of an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in
1999 brought to fruition nearly a decade of advocacy and negotiation for the
enhanced protection of women’s human rights.1 Plagued by problems of
both sweeping reservations and widespread non-compliance, the adoption of
the Optional Protocol was widely viewed as critical to the meaningful
enforcement of obligations under the Convention.2 In particular, women’s
rights afforded lesser protection by the mainstream system’s emphasis on
civil and political rights, such as women’s socioeconomic and reproductive
rights, could potentially benefit from the new instrument.3
The individual complaints procedure introduced by the Optional Protocol
has been the subject of—largely positive—scholarship and evaluation. The
inquiry procedure, also introduced by the Optional Protocol, has remained
unexamined in scholarship and under-utilized in practice despite optimism
1. See Marsha A. Freeman et al., Commentary, The U.N. Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women - A Commentary (2012)
(noting that the Convention was not immediately or universally enforced by States).
2. See id.; see also Rebecca J. Cook, International Protection of Women’s
Reproductive Rights, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 645, 645-46 (1991) [hereinafter
International Protection of Women’s Reproductive Rights] (explaining that the
protection of women’s rights has not been a high priority for governments); see also
Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination of Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L. L. 643, 647 (1990) [hereinafter Reservations
to the Convention] (arguing that reservations to the Convention pose a threat to the
achievement of equality between men and women); see also Andrew Byrnes & Jane
Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A Complaints Procedure for the
Women’s Convention?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 679, 684 (1997) (describing how the
Optional Protocol ensures “more effective implementation of the rights guaranteed in the
Convention”). See generally HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE
BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 201-50 (2000).
3. See, e.g., Montreal Principles on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 760, 762 (2004) (stating that policies and decisions made by
men are less likely to take into consideration the economic and social factors that affect
women’s lives); see also Hilary Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar? Feminist Analysis of
International Law, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 2
(Dallmeyer ed., 1993) [hereinafter Alienating Oscar?].
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about the unique potential of the inquiry procedure to be a “vehicle for
addressing systematic and structural violations of women’s equality.”4 For
the first fourteen years of the Optional Protocol, which entered into force in
December 2000, only one report, concerning the poorly-investigated deaths
and disappearances of women on the United States-Mexico border, was
issued by the CEDAW Committee under the Optional Protocol’s Article 8
procedure.5 The CEDAW Committee’s apparent reticence to utilize the
inquiry procedure is a cause for concern. Moreover, the CEDAW
Committee’s use of the inquiry procedure for grave, widespread, and
systematic violence against women in Mexico raised questions about the
procedure’s efficacy to protect against other grave or systematic violations
of women’s human rights that do not directly involve violence, such as
socioeconomic and reproductive rights.6 In 2015, the Committee published
an inquiry report concerning the high number of missing and murdered
indigenous women in Canada and an inquiry summary report on the
inaccessibility of contraceptives to women in the Philippines capital Manila.7
4. See, e.g., Andrew Byrnes & Eleanor Bath, Violence Against Women, the
Obligation of Due Diligence, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women - Recent Developments, 8
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 517, 517-18, 533 (2008) (reviewing the ten public decisions arising
from individual complaints submitted under the Optional Protocol as of 2007); see also
Bal Sokhi-Bulley, The Optional Protocol to CEDAW: First Steps, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
143, 145-57 (2006) (examining in detail two individual communications submitted to the
Committee); see also Simone Cusack & Lisa Pusey, CEDAW and the Rights to NonDiscrimination and Equality, 14 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 54, 65-83 (2013) (conducting
an in-depth review of the individual complaint procedure at the Convention); see also
Andrew Byrnes, Slow and Steady Wins the Race? The Development of an Optional
Protocol to the Women’s Convention, 91 PROC. ANN. MEETING AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 383,
387 (1997) [hereinafter Slow and Steady Wins the Race?].
5. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. on Mex.
Under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention, & Reply from the
Government of Mex., at 3, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/MEXICO (2005)
[hereinafter Rep. on Mexico] (detailing the investigations and trials employed by
Mexico).
6. See generally Cusack and Pusey, supra note 4.
7. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. of the
Inquiry Concerning Can. Under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, at 3-4, U.N. DOC.
CEDAW/C/OP.8/CAN/1 (2015) [hereinafter Rep. on Canada]; see also Comm. of the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Summary of the Inquiry Concerning the
Phil. Under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, at 2-3, U.N. DOC.
CEDAW/C/OP.8/PHL/1 (2015) [hereinafter Rep. on the Philippines].
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Further, 2018 witnessed the publication of the Committee’s fourth report
under the Optional Protocol, this time on the issue of access to abortion,
focusing on the situation of Northern Ireland within the UK state party.8
It is timely, therefore, to reflect on the inquiry procedure’s efficacy to date
and its future potential. This Article draws on the preparatory documents
leading to the Optional Protocol in order to distil the key motivations for its
adoption and, in turn, to evaluate the extent to which it has delivered its
intended results. The first motivation identified is the need to redress the
structural weaknesses of the system for the protection and promotion of
women’s human rights.9 Secondly, the Article turns to the motivation of
redressing the historical privileging of civil and political rights in the human
rights canon by attaching a robust enforcement mechanism to the full
panoply of women’s human rights guaranteed under CEDAW.10 The third
and final motivation considered in this Article is the pernicious problem of
routine state non-compliance with CEDAW.11 The Article finds that the
Committee’s use of the inquiry procedure to date evidences unmet
expectations, but significant potential nonetheless.
The under-enforcement of rights guaranteed under CEDAW is, of course,
not a problem unique to women’s human rights. It reflects broader and
deeper shortcomings in the international system for the protection and
promotion of human rights. Nevertheless, the shortcomings in the use to
date of the inquiry procedure are distinct as they evidence the enduring
salience of foundational feminist critiques of human rights. The Conclusion
proposes some possible ways forward for the Committee to enhance the
efficacy of the inquiry procedure.
I.

STRENGTHENING THE SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION
OF WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Structural Weaknesses of CEDAW

It was in response to the identified gendered shortcomings of the human
rights canon that CEDAW was adopted in 1979 and the CEDAW Committee

8. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Rep. of the
Inquiry Concerning the U. K. of Gr. Brit. & N. Ir. Under Article 8 of the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1 (2015) [hereinafter Rep. on U.K.]
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.A.
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was established to monitor its implementation.12 The Convention’s radical
departure from the established canon at the time of its adoption was
demonstrated in its broad definition of discrimination against women
encompassing both public and private life, its integration of civil and
political, social and economic rights, the permissive provision for temporary
special measures to remedy gender inequality, and its requirement on state
parties to modify discriminatory social and cultural patterns.13 The CEDAW
Convention and its monitoring Committee are therefore optimally placed to
overcome the persistent gendered shortcomings of the human rights canon.
The structural weaknesses of CEDAW are, however, manifold and welldocumented. For example, the emergence of the CEDAW text from the
Commission on the Status of Women, and not from the Commission on
Human Rights, constituted early signs of ghettoization.14 Moreover, its
passage through the Social Affairs Committee, and not the Legal Affairs
Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, signaled the sui generis and
perceived lesser legal status of the Convention.15 “In other words” concludes
Charlesworth, “[t]he creation of a specialized branch of women’s human
rights law has allowed its marginalization.”16 Further, scholarship on the
limitations of CEDAW has focused on the challenge posed by far-reaching
reservations to the Convention, whereby states seek to “hollow out the heart
of their obligations.”17 Compounding the challenge of reservations, the
Convention’s lack of an individual complaints procedure, and the
Committee’s mandate to “conside[r] the progress made in the

12. See Charlotte Bunch, Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of
Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486, 495 (1990) (illustrating how CEDAW is the
primary international legal mechanism for enforcing women’s rights as human rights);
see Reservations to the Convention, supra note 2, at 647 (explaining that the
Convention’s “object and purpose” was to eliminate such shortcomings); see also
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 1,
U.N. DOC. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professional
Interest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx [hereinafter CEDAW].
13. CEDAW, supra note 12, arts. 2(f), 4, 5(a), 10-13.
14. See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 25.
15. See id. at 26 (describing how the Committee’s work was less visible to other UN
human rights bodies as a result of its physical separation from the secretariat for those
bodies).
16. Alienating Oscar?, supra note 3, at 6.
17. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 2, at 113; see also Reservations to the
Convention, supra note 2, at 644 (stating that at least twenty-three of the one hundred
state parties to the Convention made a total of eighty-eight substantive reservations).
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implementation . . . of the Convention”18—as distinct from monitoring
compliance or determining violations—has historically posed a significant
structural obstacle to the protection and promotion of women’s rights.
Weaker implementation and obligation procedures contribute to a picture of
a fragile infrastructure for CEDAW.
Such is the acceptance of CEDAW’s structural weaknesses that some have
even advocated for a shift away from considering the Convention as a legal
instrument.19 Largely due to its endemic problems of under-enforcement,
CEDAW is often conceptualized as principally a cultural, rather than legal,
tool for the advancement of women’s rights.20 Sally Engle Merry, for
example, argues that the Convention is more important for its cultural work
than for its specific repressive function, stating “[h]uman rights law is itself
primarily a cultural system. Its limited enforcement mechanisms mean that
the impact of human rights law is a matter of persuasion rather than force, of
cultural transformation rather than coercive change. Its documents create
new cultural frameworks for conceptualizing social justice.”21 While the
operation of this cultural role is better understood with regard to challenging
violence against women, there is evidence of CEDAW performing a similar
role for women’s reproductive rights.22 These are valuable exhortations for
recognizing the Convention’s importance, even given its structural
weaknesses.
CEDAW’s under-enforcement is usefully located within broader
challenges of state commitment and compliance across the spectrum of
international human rights treaties.23 The Convention is not unique,
18. CEDAW, supra note 12, at art. 17(1).
19. See, e.g., SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS & GENDER VIOLENCE:

TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (1st ed. 2006) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS & GENDER VIOLENCE].
20. See id. at 24-25 (finding possible contradictions between the culture and the legal
rights regarding violence against women).
21. Id. at 16.
22. See id. at 61 (describing a UN special rapporteur’s use of collected information,
on the form and prevalence of violence against women from many cultures, to inform
the international community on methods regulation and prevention); see also Catherine
O’Rourke, Advocating Abortion Rights in Northern Ireland: Local and Global Tensions,
25 SOC. & L. STUD. 716, 717 (2016) [hereinafter Advocating Abortion Rights in Northern
Ireland] (finding that despite the Convention’s legal limitations, it is distinguished from
other treaty bodies “for its cultural work in affirming women’s rights and equality in
local and global settings”).
23. See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009).
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therefore, in the enforcement challenges that it confronts. Looking
comparatively across a range of rights protected by international treaties,
Beth Simmons concludes that the treaties’ impacts lie less in their direct
relationship with state parties, and more in the mobilizing framework that
they offer to domestic reform constituencies.24 The prerequisites for such
impacts are supportive conditions for social mobilization and strategic
litigation. Where such prerequisites are absent, human rights treaty
ratification cannot, of itself, compel progressive change.25 Simmons’
findings indicate broadly positive outcomes for women’s rights if CEDAW
is re-conceptualized, not principally as a set of legally-binding obligations
on states, but rather as a supportive mobilizing framework for domestic
reform constituencies.
It is critical, nevertheless, that the efficacy of a human rights instrument is
evaluated on its own express terms, namely to what extent it can provide an
effective mechanism for state accountability and enhanced compliance for
the rights guaranteed therein. The Optional Protocol to CEDAW established
two new enforcement procedures.26 Firstly, it established the right of
individuals from states that are party to the Convention to file a petition to
seek recourse for violations of their rights guaranteed under CEDAW.27
These petitions are subject to a number of procedural requirements, most
notably the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies.28 Significantly, the
Optional Protocol went beyond the right of individual petitions by also
empowering the Committee to conduct an inquiry where it has received
“reliable information of grave or systematic violations by a State Party of
rights set forth in the Convention.”29 This inquiry procedure was a novel
initiative towards strengthening the infrastructure of women’s human rights,
with the procedure’s only precedent at the time existing in the Convention
Against Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).30
24. See id. at 256 (explaining how mobilization is a function of the value that
potential claimants place on certain rights and the likelihood that mobilization will
succeed in realizing those rights).
25. Id. at 253-54.
26. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, art. 2, U.N. DOC. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999),
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/774/73/PDF/N9977473.pdf?
OpenElement [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
27. See id. at art. 2, 4(1).
28. Id.
29. Id. at art. 8(1).
30. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
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The need to redress the identified structural weaknesses underpinning
women’s human rights is evident throughout the preparatory documents that
led to the Optional Protocol’s adoption by the UN General Assembly in
1999. The procedural history of the Optional Protocol formally dates back
to the 1993 Second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna.31 The
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action called on the Commission on
the Status of Women (CSW) and the CEDAW Committee to “quickly
examine” the possibility of introducing a right of individual petition to the
CEDAW Convention by means of an Optional Protocol, in order to
“strengthen implementation of the commitment to women’s equality and the
human rights of women.”32
According to the preparatory documents, the Optional Protocol would
contribute to the “strengthening” of the system for the protection of women’s
human rights in three distinct, but complementary, ways: firstly, CEDAW’s
lack of an enforcement mechanism gave rise to a perception that the
Convention was lesser than the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) and CAT, all of which included the right of individual petition.33

Treatment of Punishment, art. 6, U.N. DOC. A/39/46, (Dec. 10, 1984) (directing states to
make an immediate preliminary inquiry into facts surrounding alleged violations of the
CAT). It should be noted that a competence similar to the CEDAW Optional Protocol
Inquiry Procedure was provided for by the Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance, art. 2, U.N. DOC. A/61/448 (Dec. 20, 2006), the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 6, U.N. DOC.
A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006), the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, U.N. Doc. A/63/435 (Dec. 10, 2008), and
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a Communications
Procedure, art. 13(7), U.N. DOC. A/RES/66/138 (Dec. 19, 2011). Nevertheless, when
the CEDAW Optional Protocol was adopted in 1999, the sole precedent for the inquiry
procedure was contained in the CAT.
31. JANE CONNORS, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN, http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/opceafdw/opceafdw_ph_e.pdf (last
visited March 25, 2018) [hereinafter Procedural History of Optional Protocol].
32. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, ¶ 40, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna
Declaration].
33. U.N. Secretary-General, Additional Views of Governments, Intergovernmental
Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations on an Optional Protocol to the
Convention, ¶ 15, U.N. DOC. E/Cn6/1997/5 (Feb. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Additional
Views] (finding that the specific procedures for considerations of women’s human rights
violations were inadequate and insufficient).
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The Optional Protocol would therefore strengthen CEDAW by “plac[ing]
the Convention on an equal footing with other human rights instruments.”34
Secondly, it was argued that an optional protocol would strengthen the
overall protection of women’s human rights by improving awareness of the
“gender dimensions of human rights by existing mechanisms and
procedures.”35 In particular, the absence of any specific procedures within
the UN system for considering individual or systematic violations of
women’s human rights was noted with considerable concern.36 Uniquely, an
optional protocol to CEDAW would contribute to the integration of the
human rights of women throughout the United Nations system by developing
a specific doctrine and jurisprudence that would inform the other human
rights mechanisms within the UN system.37
Thirdly, in negotiations that led to the Optional Protocol, state delegations
and CSW members emphasized the unique importance of the inquiry
procedure to draw attention to structural and systemic obstacles to the
protection and promotion of women’s human rights.38 Because individual
complaints may fail to reflect the systematic nature of widespread violations,
the importance of an inquiry procedure that would allow for the redress of
individual and group grievances was particularly noted.39 Moreover, as
individuals or groups may face “acute dangers of reprisal or practical
constraints on their ability to submit communications,” the inquiry procedure
would circumvent these limitations.40
34. Id. at ¶ 17; Comm’n on the Status of Women, Rep. on the Fortieth Session, ¶ 12,
U.N. DOC. E/CN.6/1996/15 (Mar. 12, 1996) [hereinafter Fortieth Session Report].
35. U.N. Secretary-General, Comparative Summary of Existing Communications
and Inquiry Procedures and Practices Under International Human Rights Instruments
and Under the Charter of the United Nations, ¶ 4, U.N. DOC. E/CN6/1997/4 (Jan. 21,
1997) [hereinafter Comparative Summary].
36. See Additional Views, supra note 33, at ¶ 15 (stating that the most concerning
women’s human rights issues receive relatively little attention under UN mechanisms).
37. Id. at ¶ 20 (explaining how an optional protocol could serve as a model for other
UN treaty bodies that lack mechanisms to consider widespread women’s human rights
violations).
38. Comparative Summary, supra note 35, at ¶¶ 8, 101.
39. See Comm’n on the Status of Women, Rep. on the Thirty-Ninth Session, ch. IV
¶ 6, U.N. DOC. E/1995/26 (1995) [hereinafter Thirty-Ninth Session Report] (describing
how a right to petition, by both individuals and groups, would create broader public
awareness of women’s human rights).
40. Byrnes & Connors, supra note 2, at 704-05, n.67 (noting that inquiry procedures
permitted groups such as Amnesty International to communicate on behalf of the
individuals or groups).
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The inquiry procedure was argued to be particularly appropriate to human
rights violations experienced by women, due to certain defining
characteristics. Principally, the inquiry procedure has the potential to capture
the widespread and systematic nature of gender inequality.41 As Byrnes and
Connors note, the inclusion of the inquiry procedure was “a move motivated
by a desire to ensure that systemic discrimination against women is
adequately addressed, especially in view of the fact that women may face
particular disadvantages in securing information about and access to
remedies.”42 Because of the relative ease of its utilization, the inquiry
procedure circumvents several of the practical obstacles to rights litigation,
in particular, financial resources, and technical expertise.43 Moreover, there
is no specific requirement for the exhaustion of domestic remedies. Thus, the
inquiry procedure avoids the burdens of stigma, publicity, and breach of
anonymity that women may face by submitting individual petitions.44
Lastly, the broad standing provided for in the Optional Protocol is highly
conducive to collective action.45 In general, the Optional Protocol inquiry
procedure provides a substantial scope for redressing the Convention’s
structural weaknesses and for advancing a new era of enforcement.
B. The Efficacy of the Inquiry Procedure to Date
Despite the lofty ambitions articulated for the CEDAW Optional Protocol,
specifically to enhance the effectiveness and enforcement of women’s rights
under the international human rights system, the Optional Protocol’s
procedures have in fact been characterized by under-usage.46 The Optional
Protocol has been relatively successful in securing ratifications. It entered
into force a little over a year after the adoption of the treaty text—admittedly
with a low threshold for the number of ratifying states.47 At this present time,
there are 109 state parties to the instrument, only five of which have opted
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 751.
Id.
See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 656.
See id.
See Byrnes & Connors, supra note 2, at 704-05 & n.67; see also Thirty-Ninth
Session Report supra note 39, at ch. IV ¶ 6.
46. Byrnes & Connors, supra note 2, at 617 (stating that only a few petitions have
been submitted).
47. See Signatures and Accessions/Ratifications to the Optional Protocol, UN
ENTITY FOR GENDER EQUALITY & THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-8b.en.pdf (last visited March 25, 2018).
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out of the inquiry procedure under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol.48
Nevertheless, in the first fourteen years after the Protocol entered into force,
only one inquiry was conducted by the Committee.49 Moreover, little has
been written about the inquiry procedure, a fact that is no doubt exacerbated
by the Committee’s apparent reticence to invoke the procedure.
The relative under-usage of the inquiry procedure may, in part, be
explained by the weaknesses that affect these types of procedures generally.
The procedures are not well-known and can be difficult to access and use,
especially for people without legal assistance.50 Both the communications
and inquiry procedures are slow, and the communications procedure also
requires the exhaustion of domestic remedies before the merits of the case
may be considered.51 Additionally, enforcement issues persist because,
although the views and decisions adopted by the Committee are
authoritative, they are not binding and there is no enforcement procedure.52
Moreover, would-be petitioners may choose to use other avenues to file a
complaint, including mechanisms at the regional level, which have binding
outcomes.53
Issues of under-enforcement also have a clearly gendered quality: fewer
women than men use the human rights communications and inquiry
procedures, suggesting that these litigation-style processes do not serve
women as well as men because of the systematic power imbalance and
disadvantage women experience, and because of their lack of resources,
literacy, and access to legal aid.54 The requirement that domestic remedies
be exhausted before the Committee will consider a communication also
poses a particular challenge for women in jurisdictions where their access to
courts is limited.55 Finally, these procedures, which relate to alleged
violations by a State party, pose further difficulty where the facts of the case
relate to non-state action, such as domestic violence.56

48. Id. (stating that Bangladesh, Belize, Colombia, Cuba, and Tajikistan chose not
to recognize Article 8).
49. Rep. on Mexico, supra note 5, ¶ 3.
50. Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 656.
51. Sokhi-Bulley, supra note 4, at 144.
52. See id. at 154-55.
53. Id. at 618.
54. Id. at 618, 656.
55. See id. at 146 (mentioning “gender-based discrimination by the courts”).
56. See id.; see also Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence
as a Human Rights Issue, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 36, 58 (1993).
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The clandestine nature of the inquiry procedure has undoubtedly
contributed to perceptions of its under-usage. Because of the confidentiality
of the procedure, it is difficult to track, in detail, the work the Committee
conducts under Article 8, but annual reports indicate that the Committee
commenced work under Article 8 in 2003.57 Later reporting revealed that
the Committee’s activity in 2003 referred to a request to investigate the
deaths and disappearances of women on the Mexico-US border and the
subsequent poor investigation of these offenses; specifically, in 2004 the
Committee made public that the 2003 inquiry activity concerned Mexico.58
In 2005, the Committee published the findings of the inquiry.59 In contrast,
from 2006 to 2010, the Committee’s annual reports indicate no activity under
Article 8.60 However, the 2011, 2012, and 2013 annual reports clarified that
the pace of requests for inquiries had accelerated.61 In its 2013 Annual
Report, the CEDAW Committee acknowledged “the urgent need to decide
on a methodology for conducting inquiries and to review existing rules of
procedures on inquiries under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol.”62 The 2014
Annual Report stated that the Committee requested that the High
57. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Ann. Rep., ch. V
¶ 441, U.N. DOC. A/58/38(SUPP) (Aug. 18, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Annual Report].
58. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Ann. Rep.,
ch. V ¶ 393, U.N. DOC. A/59/38(SUPP) (Aug. 18, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Annual
Report]; see generally Rep. on Mexico, supra note 5.
59. See 2004 Annual Report at ch. V ¶ 393; see generally Report on Mexico, supra
note 5.
60. See generally Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Ann. Rep., U.N. DOC. A/61/38(SUPP) (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Annual
Report]; Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Ann. Rep., U.N.
DOC. A/62/38(SUPP) (Jan. 1, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Annual Report]; Rep. of the
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Ann. Rep., U.N. DOC.
A/63/38(SUPP) (Aug. 12, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Annual Report]; Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Ann. Rep., U.N. DOC. A/64/38(SUPP)
(Jan. 1, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Annual Report]; Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, Ann. Rep., U.N. DOC. A/65/38(SUPP) (Jan. 1, 2010)
[hereinafter 2010 Annual Report].
61. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Ann. Rep.,
ch. V ¶¶ 19-22, U.N. Doc. A/66/38(SUPP) (Apr. 6, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Annual
Report]; see also Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Ann.
Rep., ch. V ¶ 30, U.N. DOC. A/67/38(SUPP) (Apr. 2, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Annual
Report]; see also Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Ann.
Rep., ch. I, ch. V ¶¶ 26-28, U.N. DOC. A/68/38(SUPP) (Mar. 24, 2013) [hereinafter 2013
Annual Report].
62. 2013 Annual Report, supra note 61, at ch. V ¶ 27.
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Commissioner for Human Rights service the Committee’s work under
Article 8 and provide additional resources.63 Moreover, the 2014 Report first
publicly disclosed the Committee’s activities in the Philippines under Article
8, and provided updates for six other requests for inquiries in undisclosed
states.64 A close reading of the Committee’s annual reports points to growing
civil society activity working to deliver the promise of the inquiry procedure.
For much of the past eighteen years, it seems likely that under-utilization
of the procedure by civil society groups, and the Committee’s reticence to
publicly activate the procedure, have been mutually reinforcing. The
confidentiality requirement of the procedure, whereby the Committee can
actively consider a request for inquiry without any formal notification to the
organizations that requested the inquiry, further reinforces the perception of
Committee inactivity and under-utilization of the procedure.65 Anecdotally,
there is also the purported belief amongst women’s rights advocates that the
Committee’s reticence to use the inquiry procedure reflects the Committee’s
concern that robust use of Article 8, while eighty of CEDAW’s state parties
have yet to ratify the Optional Protocol, would either encourage more newlyratifying states to opt-out of the inquiry procedure or deter states from
ratifying the Optional Protocol altogether. The apparent increase in
Committee activity under the inquiry procedure since 2015 may, however,
communicate its willingness to activate the procedure to civil society and
state parties alike and, in turn, stimulate further increased activity.
II. ENFORCING THE FULL PANOPLY OF WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Gendered Hierarchies of Human Rights
Foundational feminist critiques of human rights focus on the presumed
masculine subject of civil and political rights.66 The historic privileging of
the male political actor as the classic subject of human rights is as much an
empirical reality as a conceptual critique.67 The regular distribution of urgent
63. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Ann. Rep., ch. I,
U.N. DOC. A/69/38(SUPP) (Mar. 30, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Annual Report].
64. Id. at ch. V ¶ 25.
65. CEDAW, supra note 12, at art. 8(5) (recognizing that “[s]uch an inquiry shall be
conducted confidentially and the cooperation of the State party shall be sought at all
stages of the proceedings”).
66. See generally Gayle Binion, Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective, 17 HUM.
RTS. Q. 509 (1995) (pointing out that virtually all areas of the legal field have been
influenced by feminism).
67. See Arvonne S. Fraser, Becoming Human: The Origins and Development of

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law,

13

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1

14

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 27:1

action campaigns by human rights groups evidences this gender bias in
prosaic, but important ways.68 Rare was it that women formed the subject of
such urgent campaigns.69 Indeed, in 1993, Charlesworth damningly
characterized first generation rights as “what men most fear will happen to
them,” referring in particular to the torture of political dissidents.70
Moreover, women’s disproportionate experience with poverty and
socioeconomic deprivation means that inadequacies in the protection and
enforcement of second generation rights were not gender-neutral.71 The
controversial categorization of human rights into first generation—civil and
political—and second generation—economic, social, and cultural—reveals
a heavily gendered hierarchy.72
Consequently, advocacy for the
strengthening of economic and social rights as a tactic for the strengthening
of women’s rights is a well-established practice in the human rights canon.73
Bunch, for example, in her trailblazing articulation of strategies for the
improved protection of women’s human rights, advocated for the overall
strengthening of socioeconomic rights in the human rights system, as women
are disproportionately denied rights to food, shelter, education, and
employment.74
The novelty of CEDAW lies in its articulation of women’s civil, political,
economic, and social rights, without any distinction between so-called
generations of rights.75 The Optional Protocol offers the potential to align
enforcement measures with the full panoply of women’s human rights in the
Women’s Human Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 854, 860 (1999) (explaining that maledominated history and tradition reinforce the existing social and political order).
68. See Fortieth Session Report, supra note 34, at ¶¶ 9-60. See generally Advocating
Abortion Rights in Northern Ireland, supra note 22.
69. See CATHERINE O’ROURKE, GENDER POLITICS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 63-82
(2013) [hereinafter GENDER POLITICS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE] (discussing gendered
patterns in human rights advocacy in select case studies in Colombia, Northern Ireland,
and Chile).
70. Alienating Oscar?, supra note 3, at 8.
71. See CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 2, at 238.
72. See id. at 233.
73. Fortieth Session Report, supra note 34, at ¶¶ 9-60.
74. See Bunch, supra note 12, at 494.
75. CEDAW, supra note 12, at art. 1 (defining “discrimination against women” to
include “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil
or any other field”).
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Convention. In fact, there is evidence from the preparatory documents that
redressing the hierarchy between first and second generation rights was an
important motivation leading to the Optional Protocol. In practical terms,
tensions between the protection of first and second generation rights
manifested in debates over whether rights such as non-discrimination in
employment, education, or marriage and family relations guaranteed under
CEDAW should be designated “non-justiciable.”76 Whereas several states
pointed to the “more programmatic nature” of many of the rights guaranteed
under the Convention, other delegations noted the legal character of the
treaty and the obligation of states to execute the treaty in good faith.77 These
latter delegations feared the entire initiative might be undermined if some
provisions of critical importance did not fall within the framework of the
Optional Protocol and the competence of the Committee.78 The importance
of the Optional Protocol as a mechanism for strengthening the full panoply
of women’s human rights was evidenced by the identified need to
supplement the enforcement activities of the Human Rights Committee,
which focused exclusively on civil and political rights.79 Given these initial
lines of division among state delegations, the significance of the final text of
the Optional Protocol as an instrument for the enforcement of all rights
guaranteed by CEDAW should not be underestimated.
Tensions during the preparatory negotiations concerning the justiciability
and possible hierarchy of rights within the Convention played out in explicit
ways in the negotiation for the inquiry procedure. There was significant state
resistance to the inquiry procedure.80 States opposing the procedure argued
that it could be “unnecessarily confrontational, could require significant
human and financial resources, and was appropriate only in the context of
torture.”81 However, these standard state concerns were overlaid by more
clearly gendered concerns about the “appropriateness” of an inquiry
procedure for a Convention such as CEDAW, given that the procedure would
be confrontational and resource-intensive, which were features thought to be
76. See Fortieth Session Report, supra note 34, at ¶¶17, 106-07 (alluding to the
disagreement between delegations regarding whether all substantive provisions of the
Convention should be considered justiciable under the Protocol).
77. Id.; see Comparative Summary, supra note 35, at ¶ 6.
78. See Fortieth Session Report, supra note 34, at annex III ¶¶ 47-51.
79. Id. at annex III ¶ 48.
80. See Comm’n on the Status of Women, Rep. of the Comm’n On the Status of
Women. On its Forty-First Session, U.N. DOC. CN.61/2000/9, at app. II ¶ 59, (Mar. 1021, 1997) [hereinafter Forty-First Session Report].
81. Id.
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more appropriate to the right of freedom from torture.82 The prohibition of
torture is the quintessence of civil and political rights; it “occupies a vital
place in the human rights lexicon, a ‘no’ strongly and universally felt and
expressed.”83 Women’s human rights, by contrast, have struggled to gain
the same universal consensus, as illustrated by the large number of broad
reservations and general under-enforcement of CEDAW. Ultimately, a
compromise position in line with CAT was adopted, whereby states could
expressly opt-out of the Committee’s capacity to conduct an inquiry and
follow-up under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol.84 The opt-out provision
merits consideration as a factor in shaping the Committee’s apparent
reticence to utilize the inquiry procedure pending wider ratification of the
Optional Protocol.
B. The Efficacy of the Inquiry Procedure to Date
The precedent of the first inquiry under the CEDAW Optional Protocol,
namely, the persistent and poorly-investigated deaths and disappearances of
a large number of women on the Mexico-US border,85 was widely
understood to bear out concerns that the inquiry procedure would privilege
civil and political rights violations. To quote the Committee members
appointed to evaluate the Mexican request for an inquiry: “The situation
presented to the Committee was an emblematic case of grave violations of
women’s fundamental rights on a large and systematic scale, and therefore
ideally suited to the type of inquiry foreseen under the Optional Protocol.”86
The Committee concluded that grave and systematic violations of the rights
guaranteed under CEDAW were taking place in the jurisdiction, in violation
of the Convention and the Committee’s General Recommendation 19.87
With the exception of Article 5’s obligation to challenge discriminatory
social and cultural patterns, the identified violations largely pertained to
discrimination in law and in the administration of justice, manifesting in

82. Id.
83. HENRY STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN

RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 224 (3rd ed. 2008).
84. Optional Protocol, supra note 26, art. 10.
85. See Rep. on Mexico, supra note 5, at ¶ 3.
86. Maria Regina Tavares da Silva &Yolanda Ferrer Gómez, The Juarez Murders
and the Inquiry Procedure, in THE CIRCLE OF EMPOWERMENT: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
THE UN COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 298,
300 (Hanna-Beate Schöpp-Schilling & Cees Flinterman eds., 2007).
87. See Rep. on Mexico, supra note 5, at ¶ 259.
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impunity for the violence.88 The state was found to be acting in violation of
its due diligence obligations to prohibit, prevent, and punish these
manifestations of violence against women.89 To a large extent, with the
important exception of understanding the violations as gendered and as a
manifestation of discriminatory social and cultural patterns, the violations
identified by the Committee concern rights substantively guaranteed in other
civil and political rights-focused human rights instruments. Moreover, in
considering the evidence of grave or systematic violations, the Committee
relied on reports of the UN Commission on Human Rights Special
Rapporteurs on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, and on the
independence of judges and lawyers, once again indicating the interface—
and overlap—with civil and political rights protections.90
The focus on grave and widespread violence against women in the
CEDAW Committee’s much later inquiry in Canada, while justified by the
exigent circumstances of missing and murdered indigenous women, also
worked to reinforce concern about the procedure’s efficacy to protect the full
panoply of women’s rights guaranteed under the Convention.91 In line with
the Mexican precedent, the state was found to be acting in violation of its
due diligence obligations to provide effective protection and conduct
effective investigations and prosecutions, particularly in relation to missing
and murdered aboriginal women, victims of violence, and their families.92
The inquiry focused on violations to Article 1 (discrimination against
women), Article 2 (obligation to change domestic constitutions, laws and
policies), Article 3 (prohibition on discrimination), Article 5 (modify
discriminatory social and cultural patterns), read together with General
Recommendations 19 and 28.93 On this occasion, the specific vulnerabilities
and violations experienced by rural women and their families under Article
14 were identified.94 Further, because of what the Committee identified as
the state’s failure to protect aboriginal women from discrimination by public
88. CEDAW, supra note 12, at art. 5.; see also Rep. of Mexico, supra note 5, at ¶
261 (describing how such impunity often arises from a culture of violence and
discrimination based on women’s perceived inferiority).
89. Rep. on Mexico, supra note 5, at ¶ 275 (noting a lack of sufficient resources and
trained staff, as well as the fact that days sometimes pass before an investigation, as
examples of the state’s failure to exercise due diligence).
90. Id. at ¶ 4.
91. Rep. on Canada, supra note 7, at ¶ 3.
92. Id. at ¶ 210.
93. Id. at ¶ 211.
94. Id. at ¶ 204.
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institutions, the violation of Article 15’s equality under the law requirement
was also identified.95
The human rights canon has undoubtedly evolved considerably in recent
decades to broaden its concern beyond the male political actor. This
evolution is signaled most forcefully by two decades of steady progressive
development in the treaty, normative, and jurisprudential development of
human rights to articulate due diligence obligations on states to prohibit,
prevent, and punish violence perpetrated against women by private actors.96
These developments did not emerge unprompted from the international
community or the human rights system; rather they are the outcome of
decades of concerted feminist advocacy and activism.97 The evolution of the
human rights canon to require states to prohibit, prevent, and punish violence
against women has been an extraordinary success of global women’s rights
advocacy.98 In their review of successful transnational advocacy campaigns,
including the global campaign to end violence against women, Keck and
Sikkink identify “issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals,
especially when there is a short and clear causal chain (or story) assigning
responsibility” as that which transnational advocacy networks organize
around most effectively.99
While substantial challenges persist in
vindicating those rights, the doctrinal developments concerning violence
against women as a human rights violation have been remarkable.100
Nevertheless, these developments have occurred principally within a civil
and political rights frame and continue to privilege violations that involve
physical harm to the body.101
95. Id. at ¶ 210.
96. See generally

ALICE EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 7-12 (2011) (providing a detailed overview of how
the international human rights legal system has been influenced by the campaign for
women’s equality).
97. See generally NIAMH REILLY, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS: SEEKING GENDER
JUSTICE IN A GLOBALISING AGE 12 (2009) (discussing the Global Campaign for Women’s
Human Rights, a coalition of women’s organizations, that resulted in the adopted of
CEDAW).
98. See EDWARDS, supra note 96, at 2 (drawing on feminist analysis of international
law to illustrate the significant developments achieved through women’s advocacy).
99. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 27 (1998).
100. See generally EDWARDS, supra note 96, at 7-12 (reviewing jurisprudential and
treaty-based developments recognizing violence against women to be a violation of
international human rights law).
101. See id. at 60 (arguing that while civil and political rights of women should receive
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Even from the earliest days of transnational feminist advocacy for the
recognition of violence against women as a human rights violation, caution
was sounded about the potential of a focus on physical violence to the
body—which aligns with the dominant focus of human rights—to
overshadow other pernicious, endemic, yet largely non-physical harms of
poverty and economic inequality experienced disproportionately by
women.102 In their analysis of the Declaration emerging from the 1993
World Conference on Human Rights, which brought violence against
women to the fore as a human rights issue, Mertus and Goldberg cautioned:
To keep the women’s human rights agenda intact and focused, we
must be ever watchful that the issues of importance to women—
issues such as development, literacy, and poverty—are not lost in
the struggle to gain protection from the most visible and most
obviously detrimental abuses that entail violence.103
The potential for violence against women to advance as a human rights
issue, without the strengthening of a broader set of women’s human rights,
is usefully illustrated by the contrasting fates of violence against women and
reproductive rights within the past two decades of human rights
developments.104 The receptiveness of the international human rights
community and infrastructure to the issue of violence against women in the
1990s can be juxtaposed with the contestation and resistance encountered by
reproductive rights activists in the same period.105 In contrast to the efforts
to have violence against women recognized as a human rights violation, the
struggle to elaborate rights associated with women’s sexual freedom and
autonomy has floundered in the face of the perceived lack of “respectability”
of those arguing for sexuality rights and ideological struggles among
different religious and ethnic communities.106 Furthermore, efforts to
full protection, these are not the harms from which women need the most legal
protection).
102. Julie Mertus & Pamela Goldberg, A Perspective on Women and International
Human Rights after the Vienna Declaration: The Inside/Outside Construct, 26 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 201, 208-09 (1994).
103. Id. at 216.
104. Id.
105. See JUTTA M. JOACHIM, AGENDA SETTING, THE UN, AND NGOS: GENDER
VIOLENCE AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 133-58 (2007).
106. See Alice M. Miller, Sexual but Not Reproductive: Exploring the Junction and
Disjunction of Sexual and Reproductive Rights, 4 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 68, 70 (2000)
(explaining that the conflation of sexual rights with reproduction rights has caused sexual
rights to be considered a subset of reproductive rights, allowing such rights to disappear
or be forgotten by states); see also Stanley J. Tambiah, The Crisis of Secularism in India,
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enhance enforcement of the right to health endured substantial delay in the
adoption of an Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, as well as persistent structural weaknesses in the procedures
established.107
To illustrate the extent that robust enforcement measures are attached to
women’s reproductive rights, it is important to note the extent that they are
articulated and understood as civil and political rights. In particular,
significant human rights developments in state obligations to liberalise
access to abortion have occurred within the mainstream and regional treaty
based systems for the protection of civil and political rights.108 There is
recognition of the potential for highly restrictive abortion regimes to
constitute violations of the right to freedom from torture, and cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment, where the denial of abortion leads to the threshold
level of physical and mental harm.109 Consistent with this focus has been the
right to life concerns raised by similar circumstances in which the denial of
access to abortion has threatened the life of the pregnant woman.110 Further,
a related set of procedural obligations have been articulated, most notably by
the European Court of Human Rights, around the need for an effective
mechanism to vindicate rights to abortion where domestic regimes establish
limited provision for lawful abortion.111 Nevertheless, progress secured
through civil and political rights avenues evidence a general reluctance to
in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 431 (Rajeev Bhargava ed.,1998) (describing difficulties
faced by women seeking redress for women’s human rights violations under Muslim
personal law).
107. See Arne Vandenbogaerde & Wouter Vandenhole, The Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Ex Ante
Assessment of Its Effectiveness in Light of the Drafting Process, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV.
207, 218 (2010) (noting that such delay may have been caused by states that opposed the
Protocol); see also Catarina de Albuquerque, Chronicle of an Announced Birth: The
Coming into Life of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights – The Missing Piece of the International Bill of Human
Rights, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 144, 147 (2010).
108. See generally Christina Zampas & Jamie M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right:
International and Regional Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 251 (2008) (providing
an overview of recent developments in the UN, Europe, and Inter-American and African
human rights systems).
109. See H.R.C. Res., Karen Noelia Llantoy Huamán v. Peru, Communication No.
1153/2003, ¶¶ 3.1, 3.2(b), U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (Nov. 3, 2005).
110. Zampas and Gher, supra note 108, at 255.
111. See e.g., Tysiac v. Poland, 5410/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. 219, 249 (2007); A, B and C v.
Ireland, 25579/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. 195, 265 (2010); R.R. v. Poland, 27617/04 Eur. Ct. H.R.
209, 247 (2012).
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engage with the substantive issues of gender equality, including the rights of
individual women to appropriate healthcare and to control their reproduction
and sexuality.
In light of the focus on the deaths and disappearances of women in the
first and second inquiries, the concern in the third inquiry, with the
inaccessibility of contraceptives to women in the Philippines capital, Manila,
signaled an important expansion in the substantive focus of the inquiry
procedure.112 The articulation of state obligations to vindicate women’s
sexual and reproductive rights in the Philippines inquiry is therefore a cause
for optimism. In addition to the substantive focus on contraception, the
Philippines inquiry shares some important features with reproductive rights
violations elsewhere, in particular in scrutinizing de jure and de facto
protection of women’s reproductive rights.113 The Committee’s scrutiny of
both de jure and de facto protection of women’s reproductive rights resonates
importantly with many women’s experiences of the law, which is that rights
guaranteed on paper are often deficient in practice.114 Moreover, the
Committee’s identification and robust denouncement of the gender
stereotypes that informed the denial of publicly funded contraception to
women in the capital reveals, once again, the critical role of the CEDAW
Committee in advancing feminist-informed interpretations of the treaty’s
provisions.115
The Philippines inquiry did not, however, redress all identified concerns
with the Committee’s earlier focus on civil and political rights violations and

112. Rep. on the Philippines, supra note 7, at ¶ 51(g).
113. See id. at ¶ 3.
114. See generally CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 138 (1989)

(stating that the more that women, especially minority women, resort to law, the more
backlash they may encounter, which results in the counter-use of the law).
115. Id.; see Rep. on the Philippines, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 42-43 (“[t]he Committee
considers that article 5, read together with articles 12 and 16, requires States parties to
eliminate gender stereotypes that impede equality in the health sector and in marriage
and family relations . . . . [t]hus, the Committee finds that the implementation of
Executive Orders Nos. 003 and 030 with regard to the delivery of reproductive health
services and commodities in Manila reinforced gender stereotypes prejudicial to women,
given that they incorporated and conveyed stereotyped images of women’s primary role
as child bearers and child rearers, thereby perpetuating discriminatory stereotypes
already prevalent in Filipino society. Such stereotypes further contributed to the belief
that it was acceptable to deny women access to modern methods of contraception because
of their natural role as mothers and had the effect of impairing the enjoyment by women
of their rights under Article 12 of the Convention. The Committee concludes that the
State party has violated its obligations under Article 5 of the Convention.”).
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harms to the body. In the Committee’s limited consideration of the
violations engendered by the absence of safe and legal abortion in the city
(and, indeed, the country), the Committee frames the violation principally as
a cause of maternal deaths.116 The CEDAW violations inherent to the
absence of safe and legal abortion are not, however, identified. Moreover,
the nuanced feminist articulation of gender stereotypes and restrictions on
sexual and reproductive rights receives no airing in the discussion of unsafe
abortions. The broader implications of this narrow treatment by the
Committee of access to abortion through the inquiry procedure were
potentially significant. The approach in the Philippine’s inquiry heavily
circumscribed its relevance to the many other state parties with restrictive
abortion laws, but where unsafe abortions are not in evidence. In the absence
of a robust articulation of women’s rights to reproductive autonomy
guaranteed under the Convention, the transferability of the inquiry findings
in the Philippines case would be limited. The substantive focus of the initial
three inquiries on civil and political rights violations evidenced implicit
gender hierarchies about the sorts of violations that meet the “grave or
systematic” threshold. Given the emphasis in the preparatory documents on
the need to avoid such hierarchies, a position which was ultimately endorsed
in the text of the Optional Protocol, evidence of such hierarchies in the
Committee’s practice was concerning.
Against this backdrop, the Committee’s determination that restrictive
access to abortion in Northern Ireland constituted both “grave and
systematic”117 violations of the CEDAW carried enormous significance.
Importantly, the report gives extensive and detailed consideration to the
violation of social and economic rights caused by abortion law and policy in
the jurisdiction. Women in Northern Ireland with unwanted pregnancies
commonly travel to England and elsewhere in order to access a lawful
abortion, involving considerable financial burden. The Committee was
therefore alert to the “particularly adverse impact on women in situations of
poverty.”118
The Committee gave thoughtful consideration to the
relationship between the criminalization of abortion and women’s socioeconomic status in Northern Ireland, most notably “the link between the low
control that women have over their fertility and the disproportionate risk of
poverty faced by large families.”119 In addition, the Committee gave
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id. at ¶¶ 11, 18.
Rep. on U.K., supra note 8, at ¶ 83.
See id. at ¶ 34.
See id. at ¶ 34.
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extensive consideration to the “inadequacy of family planning support” in
Northern Ireland. The Committee drew for particular complaint the high
degree of school discretion over sexual health education and information,120
coupled with inadequate state efforts to ensure access to reproductive health
services and contraceptives.121 The Committee’s robust statement of State
party’s obligations with respect to women’s sexual health and reproductive
rights, under both articles 12 and 16, was therefore a particularly important
restatement of the indivisibility of women’s civil and political, economic,
social and cultural human rights under CEDAW.122
III. IMPROVING STATE COMPLIANCE
A. The Challenge of Routine State Non-Compliance with CEDAW
The problem of routine state non-compliance with CEDAW is bestcaptured by anthropologist Sally Engle Merry: “CEDAW is law without
sanction.”123 The challenge of state non-compliance is clearly linked to the
broader structural weaknesses of the Convention; however, it also presents a
more specific challenge to the Convention. Ongoing state non-compliance in
response to the Committee’s Concluding Observations erodes the integrity
of the Convention as a rights-guaranteeing instrument and undermines the
confidence of women and civil society who engage with the Convention’s
periodic state reporting.124 It is a persistent and pernicious challenge to the
Convention’s efficacy.
The Optional Protocol was intended to strengthen the Committee’s
capacity to address state non-compliance in three important respects. Firstly,
the Optional Protocol would empower the Committee to move beyond
constructive dialogue with states by providing a means of recourse for
women.125 The uniqueness of this enforcement opportunity was underlined
120. See id. at ¶¶ 43-44.
121. See id. at ¶¶ 45-47.
122. See id. at ¶¶ 54, 60, 72 (providing a general statement of the law and findings

with respect to the U.K.).
123. Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law – Violence Against Women and
the Human Rights System, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 941, 943 (2003) [hereinafter
Constructing a Global Law].
124. See Advocating Abortion Rights in Northern Ireland, supra note 22, at 732
(including a case study in routine state non-compliance, where the author reviews the
United Kingdom’s failure to implement successive recommendations from the
Committee on access to lawful abortion in Northern Ireland).
125. See Comparative Summary, supra note 35, at ¶ 11 (emphasis added).
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in discussions leading to the Optional Protocol, as there was a lack of specific
procedures within the United Nations system allowing for the consideration
of “specific cases or extensive violations, of women’s human rights, and
providing for the possibility of redress for violations suffered.”126 Secondly,
the Optional Protocol established the possibility for the Committee to
determine violations in specific incidences. The implementation of human
rights treaties requires the adoption of national measures by States Parties to
give effect to the provisions of the Convention and international measures
and procedures for enforcing the Convention.127 The importance of the
ability to move beyond Concluding Observations to specific determinations
on violations is symbolically and practically important: by determining that
rights guaranteed under CEDAW have been violated, the Committee
reaffirms that rights under the Convention are not merely aspirational;
moreover, determining violations provides a baseline against which state
parties can measure their performance.128 Thirdly, the Optional Protocol
offered a means to redress state non-compliance by establishing an integrated
and ongoing system of state accountability for implementing the
Committee’s recommendations.129 Specific incidences of non-compliance
can be challenged through individual communications and inquiries.
Moreover, the Committee can provide detailed guidance to states parties in
their efforts to implement the Convention with respect to these specific
violations, while periodic state reporting provided accountability for broader
issues of non-compliance. 130 The enforcement mechanisms established by
the Optional Protocol provided the basis for a more integrated approach to
redressing non-compliance in an ongoing way through individual
communications, inquiries, and periodic state reporting.131

126. Additional Views, supra note 33, at ¶ 15.
127. Id. at ¶ 16.
128. Audrey R. Chapman, A Violations Approach for Monitoring the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 23, 38 (1996).
129. Comm’n on the Status of Women, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, Including the Elaboration of a Draft Protocol to the
Convention: Additional Views of Governments, Intergovernmental Organizations and
Non-Governmental Organizations on an Optional Protocol to the Convention, ¶ 18, U.N.
DOC. E/Cn6/1997/5 (1997).
130. U.N. Secretary-General, Follow-Up to the Fourth World Conference on Women:
Review of Mainstreaming in the Organizations of the United Nations System, ¶¶ 48-51,
U.N. DOC. E/CN. 6/1997/2 (Feb. 7, 1997) [hereinafter Follow-Up].
131. Id. at ¶¶ 54-57.
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B. The Efficacy of the Inquiry Procedure to Date
From its limited utilization to date, the efficacy of the inquiry procedure
in providing recourse to victims of “grave or systematic” violations has been
significantly compromised by the timeline involved in activating the
procedure. Writing in 2007, the two CEDAW Committee members who led
the Mexico inquiry observed: “[c]ompared to the communication procedure,
[the inquiry procedure] has the advantage of not requiring the exhaustion of
domestic remedies and its less formal process makes a timely response
possible.”132 Despite this optimistic early assessment, the timelines involved
in activating the inquiry procedure have been lengthy. While this assessment
was arguably accurate in the case of the Mexico inquiry, the request for an
inquiry that ultimately led to the publication of the inquiry report on Mexico
in 2005 was first made October 2002 and it has not been true of the
subsequent inquiries.133 The Canadian inquiry report published in 2015
resulted from a request made in January 2011.134 The timeline involved in
the activation of the procedure in the Philippines and Northern Ireland cases
are particularly striking. The request for an inquiry into the Philippines was
first submitted to the Committee in June 2008.135 The Committee decided
relatively quickly, November 2009, to proceed to an inquiry, however all
further stages of the procedure operated very slowly.136 In July 2010, two
Committee members were appointed to conduct the inquiry, and in
November 2012, the Committee members visited Manila to investigate the
alleged violations,137 with the publication of the summary report in 2015. In
the case of Northern Ireland, the initial request to conduct an inquiry was
made in December 2010; in September 2016, designated members of the
Committee visited the state party. The inquiry report was finally published
in February 2018, more than seven years after the initial request. These
lengthy timelines evidence real potential to corrode confidence in the
procedure, as well as undermine one of the Committee’s stated motivations
for the inquiry procedure in the first instance, namely, to be a “timely
response” process to state non-compliance.138
More positively, in terms of providing recourse to victims of CEDAW
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See da Silva & Gómez, supra note 86, at 299.
Rep. on Mexico, supra note 5, at ¶ 3.
Rep. on Canada, supra note 7, at ¶ 3.
Rep. on the Philippines, supra note 7, at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id.
da Silva & Gómez, supra note 86, at 299.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law,

25

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1

26

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 27:1

violations, the Committee has emphasized throughout the inquiry reports to
date that state parties cannot hide behind decentralized systems in order to
negate state responsibility for grave or systematic violations.139 A feature
common to the four state parties scrutinized through the inquiry procedure is
the operation of devolved or decentralized administrations.
The
Committee’s determined rejection of state party efforts to abdicate
responsibility for non-compliance is consistent with its articulations
elsewhere of state responsibilities under the Convention.140 Moreover, it
provides a practical and unambiguous response to one of the most common
state justifications for violations.141
In terms of empowering the Committee to identify violations of the
Convention, continuing uncertainty around the precise thresholds to activate
the inquiry procedure is unhelpful. In the three inquiries made public to date,
the Committee has confirmed that the violations met the threshold of gravity
to activate the procedure.142 While the Committee declined to elaborate on
the gravity criterion in the Mexico inquiry report, the definition advanced
throughout the two subsequent inquiry reports has been consistent, namely
“[t]he Committee’s findings regarding the gravity of the violations must take
into account, notably, the scale, prevalence, nature and impact of the
violations found.”143 Committee practice in determining the “systematic”
nature of the violation has, however, varied. Neither the Optional Protocol
itself, nor the Committee’s Rules of Procedure, offers any detail as to how
the “systematic” threshold is defined or determined.144 Further, in the
Mexico inquiry report, the Committee declined the opportunity to elaborate
the threshold for establishing “systematic” violations of the Convention.145
Notably, in academic writing, members of the Committee advanced the

139. See, e.g., Rep. on Canada, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 118, 195; see also Rep. on the
Philippines, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 2, 9, 19, 23; see also Rep. on UK, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 5253, 82.
140. Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article
2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
¶ 39, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/GC/28 (Oct. 19, 2010).
141. See, e.g., Rep. on Canada, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 118, 195; see also Rep. on the
Philippines, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 2, 9, 19, 23; see also Rep. on UK, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 53.
142. See generally 2014 Annual Report, supra note 63.
143. See Rep. on Canada, supra note 7, at ¶ 213 (emphasis added); see also Rep. on
the Philippines, supra note 7, at ¶ 47 (emphasis added).
144. See 2014 Annual Report, supra note 63.
145. Id.
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following—useful—definition of the term:
Systematic violation means that the violation is not an isolated case,
but rather a prevalent pattern in a specific situation; one that has
occurred again and again, either deliberately with the intent of
committing those acts, or as the result of customs and traditions, or
even as the result of discriminatory laws or policies, with or without
such purpose.146
The Committee’s lengthiest deliberation to date on the threshold for the
‘systematic’ criterion is contained in the Philippines summary report, which
echoes the definition above in determining that the violations can be
systematic with or without the state’s intent.147 Further, the Committee
determined that the “systematic nature of violations can also be assessed in
the light of the presence of a significant and persistent pattern of acts that do
not result from a random occurrence.”148 This standard was reiterated in the
Northern Ireland inquiry report,149 with a determination that:
The systematic nature of the violations stem from the deliberate
retention of criminal laws and state policy disproportionately
restricting access to sexual and reproductive rights, in general, and
highly restrictive provision, in particular.150
Ultimately, however, fuller elaboration by the Committee of its reasoning
in determining why “systematic” violation was not identified, as in the
Canadian case, will be necessary.151
Finally, in terms of empowering the Committee to ensure continuing state
accountability to the Committee on the implementation of those
recommendations, there are promising signs of the useful linkage by the
Committee of its decision to activate the procedure and state failure to
implement recommendations contained in Concluding Observations. Both
the Canadian and U.K. inquiries are procedurally important because their
activation was directly connected to the state’s failure to implement the
Committee’s recommendations in earlier Concluding Observations. In the
2008 periodic review, the Committee identified the cases of missing and
murdered women in Canada as a priority issue, selecting its
recommendations in this regard for “follow-up” prior to the State party’s

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See da Silva & Gómez, supra note 86, at 300.
See Rep. on the Philippines, supra note 7, at ¶ 48.
Id.
Rep. on U.K., supra note 8, at ¶ 82.
See da Silva & Gómez, supra note 86, at 300.
See Rep. on Canada, supra note 7, at ¶ 213.
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next scheduled periodic report.152 When the Committee determined in
January 2011 that the recommendation had not been implemented by
Canada, and in October 2011 that the state had failed to provide further
requested additional information on implementation, the Committee decided
to activate the inquiry procedure with respect to Canada.153 In Northern
Ireland, also, the inquiry is procedurally important because its activation was
directly connected to the state’s failure to implement the Committee’s
recommendations
in
earlier
Concluding
Observations.
After
recommendations to the U.K. in 1999 calling for action on access to
abortion,154 the Committee’s Concluding Observations in 2013 prioritized
recommendations on abortion in Northern Ireland for “follow-up”.155 In
November 2014, after determining that the U.K. had failed to implement its
priority “follow-up” recommendations, the Committee opted to proceed with
the inquiry.156 Neither the Optional Protocol, nor the Committee’s Rules of
Procedure,157 formally requires that the Committee first determine that the
periodic reporting and follow-up procedures are exhausted before
proceeding under Article 8. Also, the follow-up procedure utilized in this
instance did not in fact exist at the time of the Mexican inquiry. The
Canadian case is therefore valuable for illuminating further factors that may
inform the Committee’s determination to proceed with an inquiry. Further,
it speaks in potentially important ways to the need to provide practical
responses to CEDAW’s under-enforcement. If non-implementation of the
Committee’s recommendations that are identified for priority “follow-up”
carry the credible risk of the Committee activating the inquiry procedure,
this development introduces consequences for the state of persistent noncompliance with the Committee’s recommendations. It also stands to create
a useful and constructive relationship between state periodic examinations,
shadow reporting, and requests for an inquiry.

152. Id. at ¶10.
153. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.
154. Rep. of Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Twenty-

First Session (7-25 June 1999), ¶ 310, U.N. DOC. A/54/38/Rev.1, GAOR Fifty-Fourth
Session Supplement No. 38 (1999).
155. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding
Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, ¶ 68, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/GBR/CO/R7 (July 30, 2013).
156. Rep. on U.K., supra note 8, at ¶ 82.
157. Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, U.N. DOC. A/56/38 (SUPP) [hereinafter CEDAW Rules of Procedure].
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IV. CONCLUSION: WAYS FORWARD FOR THE INQUIRY PROCEDURE
The escalation in the public use of the inquiry procedure since 2015
signals the Committee’s greater confidence in its utilization, as well as
sending an important signal to state parties about the potential consequences
of continued non-compliance. This Article finds that the promise of the
inquiry procedure has, eighteen years after Optional Protocol’s entry into
force, not yet been delivered. Nevertheless, the Article has identified areas
of good practice and issues for priority attention in order to ensure the inquiry
procedure’s efficacy into the future. While this Article identified the
enduring salience of foundational feminist critiques of human rights in the
Committee’s practice to date through the inquiry procedure, the Article also
proposes practical measures to ameliorate the most problematic issues
identified. The Conclusion deals with these proposals in turn.
Firstly, the issue of timelines is a very real and practical obstacle to wider
utilization of the inquiry procedure by civil society. Further, it bolsters state
party perceptions that lengthy delays in communicating with the Committee
serve state interests. Efforts by the Committee to build its capacity to
respond to inquiry requests158 would be very usefully accompanied by the
Committee’s consideration of an expedited procedure for considering
requests and communicating with states. It is clear in both the Canadian and
Philippines cases that delays were primarily due to the state party’s delay in
responding to requests for information and scheduling the visit to the state
party’s territory, and the Committee’s capacity to redress such delays is
admittedly limited. Nevertheless, the Committee has itself noted “the urgent
need to decide on a methodology for conducting inquiries and to review
existing rules of procedures on inquiries under Article 8 of the Optional
Protocol,”159 which suggests that there is scope for the Committee to
streamline in its own procedures in order to reduce unnecessarily delay.160
Further, the Committee is empowered to conduct an inquiry without a visit
to the territory of the relevant state party. While this approach is clearly less
desirable as a methodology, it is within the range of options open to the
Committee in order to further expedite inquiry requests and may merit
further consideration. The publication of two inquiry reports in 2015,
followed by the 2018 publication of the U.K. report, may introduce new
urgency in state responses to the Committee, as the prospect that an inquiry
will proceed becomes more credible.
Secondly, incipient signs of a relationship between state failure to
158. See 2013 Annual Report, supra note 61, at ¶27.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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implement recommendations from the Committee’s Concluding
Observations—in particular where the “follow-up” procedure has been
attached to particular recommendations, and the Committee’s ultimate
decision to conduct an inquiry—are positive. They could usefully be
reinforced through greater elaboration of the relationship in any further
inquiry reports.
Thirdly, there is a need for much greater legal clarity in the definition and
threshold applied by the Committee in determining the “systematic”
violation of the Convention. Practice to date has not been either entirely clear
or consistent. Greater clarity could be ensured through amendment to the
Rules of Procedure.161 On the whole, the proposals here regarding timeline,
relationship to concluding observations, and clarity in the legal standards
applied, could all be usefully supported through the adoption of a General
Recommendation by the Committee dedicated to clarifying procedural and
substantive questions concerning the inquiry procedure.
Finally, the Committee is encouraged to continue its pursuit of bolder
normative and doctrinal developments in interpreting Convention
protections of social and economic rights through the inquiry procedure as
evidenced in the Northern Ireland inquiry report. As the short discussion of
European Court of Human Rights abortion jurisprudence illustrates, while
the institutions and courts dedicated to the protection of civil and political
rights are critical actors in advancing women’s rights, it is the CEDAW
Committee that is uniquely capable of developing of a broad swathe of
women’s rights through its robust interpretation of the Convention.162
Experience from the campaign to recognize violence against women as a
human rights violation evidences the importance of the CEDAW Committee
in articulating and advancing subaltern interpretations of human rights
obligations that ultimately penetrate the mainstream human rights system.163
As Merry observes, culture is as much present in international human rights
conferences and UN institutions as in local villages (though typically
associated only with the latter).164 The Committee has, to date, fostered
broader cultural change within the international human rights system through
constructive dialogue, General Recommendations, and, more recently, the
jurisprudence developed under the individual communications. It is critical
to do so also through focused use of the inquiry procedure.
161. See generally CEDAW Rules of Procedure, supra note 157.
162. See e.g., Tysiac v. Poland, 5410/03 EUR. CT. H.R. 219, 249 (2007); A, B and C

v. Ireland, 25579/05 EUR. CT. H.R. 195, 265 (2010); R.R. v. Poland, 27617/04 EUR. CT.
H.R. 209, 247 (2012).
163. See EDWARDS, supra note 96, at 168-72.
164. HUMAN RIGHTS & GENDER VIOLENCE, supra note 19, at 16.
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